DEF 15 RYU IS-US

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Document Date: 09-08-1967
Document Type: Memorandum
From: Denney
To: Sec State

Subject:

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

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Pol 12 Japan
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Def 15-3 Japan-US

A-119 NO.

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TO : Department of State

INFO: FUKUOKA, KOBE-OSAKA, NAGOYA, NAHA, SAPPORO

(Note: contents of this airgram sent Action to HICOM/POLAD and Info. CINCPAC/POLAD by telegram Tokyo 504)

FROM : Amembassy TOKYO DATE: July 27, 1967

SUBJECT : DSP on Reversion and US Bases in Okinawa

REF :

July 24 Tokyo Shimbun front page article reported DSP Chairman Nishimura plans to visit Okinawa in mid or late August to promote "active" DSP policy on reversion, strengthen relations between DSP and Okinawan Socialist Masses Party (OSMP), and to strengthen Okinawan reversion movement, in order to influence "Japan-US negotiations" (presumably reference to PriMin's visit to US in fall). Stressing argument that reversion of administrative rights should take priority over "bases question", article says Nishimura and Eiichi NAGASUE, Chairman of DSP Education and Publicity Committee (and influential member of DSP Okinawa Committee), have restated DSP policy on Okinawa in view growing belief in US that return of Okinawa before 1970 in best interest of Japan and US, and with attitude that if consensus on subject can be developed in Japan, DSP could cooperate with GOJ negotiations on issue. Article describes Nishimura policy as (1) "basic" reaffirmation of DSP stand calling for complete reversion of administrative rights and rejecting reversion with nuclear bases; (2) giving reversion of administrative rights priority over base problem, with US relinquishing administration while bases question is reserved for subsequent US-Japan negotiation; and (3) postponing final negotiations on status of Okinawan bases until Japanese public can consider it in context of revising Security Treaty along DSP lines to restrict stationing US Forces in Japan to emergencies; in meantime Okinawa bases would come within scope of present US-Japan Security Treaty, including prior consultation provisions. Article says Nishimura hopes to urge DSP views on PriMin Sato before Sato visits US.

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FORM DS-323 4-62

Drafted by: POL:RFPfeiffer/TWAinsworth:jl 7/26/67

Contents and Classification Approved by: POL:LMHarter

Clearances: POL:REArmstrong

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Authority NND969000
By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

Eki SONE, DSP International Affairs Committee Chairman, told EmbOff Tokyo Shimbun story was leak of intra-party discussion that aims at filling gap in DSP policy on Okinawa, which up to now has ignored status of bases on assumption reversion not likely in foreseeable future. Shimoda statements and speculation that Okinawa will be major topic of PriMin Sato's visit to Washington, forced party to clarify position. Sone said August 9 CEC meeting would probably reach decision on Nishimura trip and on DSP Okinawa policy, and that latter likely to be along lines Tokyo Shimbun story, which Sone feels represents "logical extension" previous DSP policy and consensus of DSP thinking on Okinawa. Sone went out of way to point out DSP had to take position on all aspects Okinawa question and that he fully aware US would make reversion administrative rights contingent on conditions for its use of bases in Okinawa.

Given standing DSP policy of demanding reversion of Okinawa on basis of legalistic arguments and party's critical attitude toward presence of US bases in Japan, new element in Nishimura-Nagasue thinking seems to be implication that reversion on terms palatable to national consensus in Japan, even without concurrent resolution of Okinawa base problem along line advocated by DSP doctrine, could be acceptable to party. DSP could not openly abandon strictures against nuclear bases. Emphasis on "national consensus" in Japan may be meant as veiled criticism of JSP and other elements in Japanese left which advocate making Okinawa focus of anti-American "peace" and anti-Security Treaty campaigns.

Proposed Nishimura visit to Okinawa appears have strong potential for impressing on leadership of moderate opposition party importance of Ryukyus bases in defense of Japan and in security of Far East. Embassy less able than authorities in Okinawa to estimate possibilities of DSP in turn exerting helpful influence on OSMP, but we believe that Nishimura and other current DSP leaders will be inclined advise their Okinawan counterparts to follow moderate policies and avoid clashes with US. We will of course furnish HICOM more detailed information on proposed visit when available.

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EXDIS

REFS: Defense 3769, DTG 141259Z Aug 67.

1. Defense informs us that tropical storm in vicinity of Guam may repeat may necessitate evacuation of 29 repeat 29 B52s from Guam to Okinawa for weather refuge. Balance of B52 force up to 25 aircraft have been granted authority for weather refuge at U Tapao, Thailand (Bangkok 5866-NOTAL). Also possibility is evacuation of 8 to 10 repeat 8 to 10 KC 135 tankers from Okinawa to Ching Chuan Kang, Taiwan to provide room for B52s. Decision on evacuation expected about 1800 Washington time today.

2. We cannot forecast at this time necessity to mount B52 operations from Okinawa or refueling operations from CCK. However, this is possibility and you will be kept informed. XXXXXXXXXX

NOL 27 VIET S ISL XR DEF 12 YS DET 15 RYU

Drafted by: EA:Col.RWCowperd:aoa 11/10/67

Tel. Ext.

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: EA - Philip C. Habib

Clearances:
OSD/PA-Col. Susskind (subs.)
OSD/ISA- Maj. Cooke
(JtStf-JS-Col Strout
S/S- JPWalsh
EA/J-Mr. Sneider
EA/ROC-Mr. Thayer
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FORM 8-65 DS-322

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By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

Intelligence Note -729

September 12, 1967

To : The Secretary
Through: S/S
From : INR - George C. Denney, Jr. G.C.D.J.

Subject: Republic of China Opposes Reversion of Ryukyu Islands to Japan

Recent publicity about Japan's "residual sovereignty" over the Ryukyu Islands and about Japanese Prime Minister Eisaku Sato's forthcoming visit to the United States has provoked several protests from the Republic of China (GRC). The GRC's primary concern appears to be the possibility of a weakening of Taiwan's security if the Ryukyus are returned to Japan and the US military bases there are dismantled. The GRC's request that it be consulted prior to any change in the Ryukyus' status and suggestions that a plebiscite be held probably indicate a desire at least to delay as long as possible any transfer of authority from the US to Japan. The question of face also plays a part, since the GRC, as one of the war-time Big Four, a signatory of the Peace Treaty, and the major victim of Japanese aggression, believes it has a legitimate role to play in the disposition of those territories.

GRC States Opposition. Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials have voiced GRC concern over the possibility of the Ryukyu Islands' reversion to Japan several times during the past few months. In an informal conversation with two US State Department officials on May 15, 1967, Foreign Minister Wei Tao-ming said that any US withdrawal from the Ryukyus accompanied by reversion to Japan would cause serious strategic and military problems for

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TO : SECSTATE

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ANALYSIS BRANCH

FROM : Amembassy TOKYO

DATE: August 29, 1967

SUBJECT : DOMESTIC POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF OKINAWA REVERSION: COMMENTS OF DIRECTOR, SPECIAL

REF : AREAS LIAISON BUREAU

Action Assigned to EA/J
Action Taken 9/1/67
Date of Action EA/J
Action Officer
Name of Officer
Control Symbol

A memorandum of a conversation with Mr. Kokichi YAMANO, Director of the Special Areas Liaison Bureau of the Prime Minister's Office, is attached. Yamano is a plain-spoken, hard-headed bureaucrat, shrewd, honest, and "Mr. Continuity" in the bureau which provides the interface between the political leadership and the Gaimusho.

Mr. Yamano sought the interview with the DCM in order to explain his own position on Okinawa reversion, which is one of strong support for the "enclave" solution, whereunder the United States would retain exclusive control over base sites and access roads and ports while allowing "complete" reversion of the rest of Okinawa. This aspect of Mr. Yamano's remarks is of less current significance than his discussion of the reasons for ruling out the principal alternatives to the enclave solution: i.e., (1) the alternative under which, coincidentally with reversion, a special agreement, separate from the Security Treaty, would be concluded regarding U.S. base rights in the Ryukyus; and (2) the alternative under which reversion would be accompanied by an expanded and modified version of the Security Treaty's understanding on "prior consultation" to give Japan's advance consent to any use of the bases which America might propose. (Mr. Yamano regards the alternative of Japan's advance consent to all proposed uses except nuclear uses as a variant of this second alternative.) In sum, Yamano says that these alternatives would prove unacceptable because their political price would exceed that paid in 1960 for the revision of the Security Treaty.

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FORM DS-323 4-62

Drafted by: DCM:DLOsborn

Contents and classification Approved by: AMB:UAJohnson

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Yamano failed to mention the alternative of reversion with U.S. bases subject to the same restrictions as those applicable to bases in Japan proper.

It is easy to see why the "special agreement" formula for reversion might arouse the same kind of storm that treaty revision did in 1960, inasmuch as it would involve the conclusion, in effect, of a new and much more dangerously "open-ended" treaty. Yamano's reasons for objecting to the other alternative are less self-evident but not implausible.

Yamano's argument against the "advance consent" formula is that, whatever the optics might be, the formula would constitute a de facto revision of the Treaty; the GOJ would thus be unable, in the end, to avoid putting it up to the Diet for ratification, and this would set the stage for a repetition of the "anti-Treaty struggle" of 1959-60. Of some interest is Yamano's claim (which we see no reason to dispute) that Masami TAKATSUJI, Director of the Cabinet's Legal Bureau, shares his opinion that the formula would amount to de facto Treaty revision.

Yamano's warnings are of course subject to discount on several grounds: his personal preference for the "enclave" solution; the continuing general drift of popular attitudes toward the right and toward greater acceptance of the security relationship with the United States; and the fact that widespread agitation by the opposition is not (as survival of the conservative GOJ since 1960 demonstrates) to be equated with the end of the world. Nevertheless, given Yamano's integrity and experience, his warnings should not be just shrugged off, but should be kept in mind as part of the context in which we are approaching both Okinawa reversion and 1970.

Also of note in the memorandum: relationships between Foreign Minister MIKI and Prime Minister SATO in anticipation of their respective visits to Washington; opinion within the Ministry on reversion formulae, with TOGO (American Bureau) favoring the "advance consent" formula with nuclear weapons, while others in the Ministry incline toward the same formula but with nuclears excluded.

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By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Participants: Mr. Kokichi YAMANO, Director Special Liaison Areas, Prime Minister's Office
David L. Osborn, DCM, Amembassy Tokyo

Date: August 24, 1967

Place: Imperial Hotel, Tokyo

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1. Three Basic Reversion Concepts:

YAMANO said he had asked me to confer with him privately so that he could outline to me the proposals that he had submitted to the Prime Minister's office and to the Foreign Office regarding Okinawa reversion. He said there were three basic concepts of reversion, as follows:

A. The special agreement concept; under this concept, administrative rights would revert to Japan but, rather than applying the Security Treaty to Okinawa, a special agreement would be worked out governing our bases there and this special agreement would guarantee all the freedoms and rights we now enjoy with regard to Okinawa bases;

B. (1) Advance consent to free use including nuclear weapons; under this concept, the Island's administration would revert and the Security Treaty would apply to our bases, but there would be an understanding reached whereby Japan would give its prior consent to any use of the bases (including the storage and employment of nuclear weapons) which the U.S. might propose; (2) advance consent except for nuclear weapons; this would be the same as (1) except that it would be made clear that the prior consent given by Japan did not extend to the introduction, storage or use of nuclear weapons;

C. The enclave concept; administrative rights over Okinawa would be restored to Japan but the sites of military bases, together with necessary access roads and harbors would be exempted and left under United States' control for as long as security considerations might require.

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Yamano acknowledged that the enclave concept (which he favored) would be challenged on the grounds that base and non-base areas in Okinawa are inextricably intertwined. He dismissed the objections by pointing out that all base areas are subject to land use contracts and these contracts are very explicit in designating areas. With respect to access roads and ports, there would be no particular problem here, since the jurisdictional arrangements could be worked out subject to change in emergencies or in response to special requirements.

2. Political Problems With First Two Concepts:

Yamano said he was absolutely certain that neither of the first two concepts would be acceptable to the Japanese public or realizable without an unacceptable cost in terms of political and public relations problems. The special agreement formula, he thought, would surely arouse even more of a storm than the revision of the Security Treaty in 1960 and would surely prove to be impossible to get through the Diet. While the second formula, that of advance consent, was superficially more attractive, he said the problem here was that advance consent could not be given in the fashion proposed without thereby constituting a de facto amendment of the Security Treaty. Yamano said this was not only his opinion but also Mr. TAKATSUJI, Director of the Legal Bureau of the Cabinet, had confirmed in writing his own opinion that such advance consent would constitute "substantial" revision of the existing Treaty. In practical terms, the opposition would be able to agitate the general public with charges that the advance consent to the combat use (or combat use plus nuclear weapons) in the case of Okinawa bases would mean that bases in Hokkaido, Kyushu, or anywhere else in Japan proper might also be used in such a manner. Yamano thought that such agitation would probably succeed in creating a furor sufficient to deter the government from going through with such an understanding, at least without prior reference to the Diet.

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Yamano said that despite the various difficulties with moving ahead on any of the three concepts, it was going to be absolutely vital from Sato's standpoint to be able to show the people of Japan some evidence of forward motion with regard to Okinawa as a result of his Washington trip. He felt that actual reversion under his preferred concept (the enclave concept) might be put off as long as five or six years, but there would have to be some concrete program in the direction of reversion to take place in the intervening years. Yamano strongly urged the advantages of effecting such a program by steps which appear to amount to functional reversion. For instance, he saw no reason why meteorological responsibilities for the Okinawa area vis-a-vis the WMO should not be assumed by Japan. He also saw no real reason why Japan and the United States could not administer jointly numbers of other activities, including education.

3. Attitudes in Foreign Ministry:

Yamano said he had recently had an argument with TOGO about reversion concepts during which Togo expressed very strong support for formula B(1)--Prior consent to free use plus nuclear weapons. However, Yamano said recent indications including comments in the press had given him the impression that the balance of the Foreign Office opinion was heavily in favor of reversion concept B(2) --Prior consent to free use except for nuclear weapons.

4. SATO-MIKI Relationship:

Yamano said Miki was definitely cast down over the Prime Minister's recent peremptory request that the Foreign Office leave Okinawa reversion in his hands. Regardless of Miki's or Sato's own personal views and intentions, each man has his own political subordinates, all of whom were rivalling one another in promoting their chiefs' interests. In this context, it might prove difficult for Miki to remain as the Prime Minister's man in charge of the Okinawa negotiations indefinitely. At least, this appeared to be the worry of some senior officials of the Foreign

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Ministry, despite their general recognition that Miki is the best Foreign Minister Japan has had in a long time and one of her top statesmen in any capacity. Yamano said he did not consider it at all likely that Sato would drop Miki from the Cabinet on the occasion of the reshuffle which is expected to take place following Sato's Washington visit in November, but he did expect Miki to leave the Cabinet at some point thereafter.

5. Miki's Conversations in Washington:

Yamano said Miki and Miki's advisors were concerned about the Foreign Minister's forthcoming conversations in Washington. Having in effect been told to lay off the more urgent aspects of the Okinawa problem what would there be for Miki to talk about? Yamano said Togo had recently asked him for his suggestions, and Yamano provided Togo with a list of topics related to the "oneness" of Okinawa and Japan. These topics in effect amount to preparatory steps which might be considered in aligning Okinawa administration with that of Japan. One of the proposed steps which Yamano thought particularly interesting is the suggestion that the United States and Japan establish and jointly fund the Okinawa Development Bank.

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DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

Research Memorandum

REA-50, November 1, 1967

To : The Secretary
Through: S/S
From : INR - Thomas L. Hughes Thomas L. Hughes

Subject: Japanese/Okinawan Focus on Reversion

Attention to the reversion question is at a high pitch in Japan and Okinawa, pending Japanese Prime Minister Sato's mid-November visit to Washington. This paper analyzes party, press, and popular attitudes toward the issue and the future status of US bases in Okinawa.

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ABSTRACT

Prime Minister Sato's announced intention to negotiate the status of the US-administered Ryukyu and Bonin Islands during his mid-November visit to Washington has markedly raised popular hopes for progress toward reversion. Japanese government efforts to educate the public on the important role Okinawa's bases play in the US East Asian security posture have intensified public debate over Japanese negotiating strategy as well as Japan's own security role. The intense focus on this key US-Japanese issue magnifies the significance of the outcome of Sato's negotiations.

Apparently convinced that the United States will not give up any of its essential rights in Okinawa at this time and will not consent to a reduction of its base rights to the limitations imposed by the US-Japan Security Treaty* (Sato himself would oppose a limitation on US base rights in Okinawa which would weaken US

Cancelled

* The United States now uses the bases in Okinawa without any requirement to consult the Japanese, though political considerations naturally inhibit entirely "free use." There are no limitations as to the type of weapons the US may deploy in Okinawa. In Japan, under the US-Japan Security Treaty arrangements, the US must consult with the Japanese Government prior to making major changes in the deployment of US forces and their equipment as well as prior to using the bases for combat operations outside the treaty area. The Japanese have already indicated that they would not assent to the introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan, and prior consultations would be required for using the bases in such cases as direct support of the Vietnam war, etc.

This report was produced by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Aside from normal substantive exchange with other agencies at the working level, it has not been coordinated elsewhere.

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(Note: contents of this airgram sent Action to HICOMRY and Info. CINCPAC by telegram Tokyo 538)

RS/AH
ANALYSIS BRANCH

FROM : Amembassy TOKYO

DATE: July 31, 1967

SUBJECT : Proposed JSP Visit to Okinawa

REF : Tokyo 504; A-119

Reliable JSP headquarters staff member told EmbOff JSP SecGen Narita and party of approximately 10 would apply shortly for permission to visit Okinawa September 5 through 9. Source stated Narita wishes to meet HICOM.

Narita visit to Okinawa, like Komeito visit in June and probable DSP visit in August (ref) reflects expectation in Japan that Okinawa will be major topic of conversations during PriMin Sato's visit to Washington. Unlike Komeito and DSP however, JSP appears likely to seek to step up exploitation of Okinawa issue in attacks on US as well as GOJ.

Although JSP cannot be expected to abandon hard-nosed policy of complete reversion administrative rights and elimination US bases in Okinawa, Embassy feels Narita visit offers opportunity to expose key JSP leader to facts of life in Okinawa, particularly progress being made in economic and social fields. Embassy therefore recommends Narita group be given thorough briefing with emphasis on above mentioned fields and luncheon at high level, if possible by Civil Administrator.

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FORM 4-62 DS-323

Drafted by: POL:RFPfeiffer:jl 7/31/67

Contents and Classification Approved by: POL:LMPurnell (in draft)

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POL:REArmstrong

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SUBJ: FURTHER DEBATE ON "SHIMODA CONCEPT"

1. IN COURSE OF EXTENSIVE INTERPELLATIONS BEFORE LOWER HOUSE SPECIAL OKINAWA COMMITTEE ON JUNE 28, GOJ, AND PARTICULARLY FONMIN MIKI, CARRIED SOMEWHAT FURTHER PUBLIC ADUMBRATION OF GOVTS THINKING RE "SHIMODA CONCEPT" (OFFER OF AGREEMENT TO NUKES AND FREE USE OF BASES IN OKINAWA IN RETURN FOR RETURN OF ADMINISTRATIVE RIGHTS).

2. FONMIN MIKI WAS REPORTED TO HAVE SAID, IN SUMMARY:

A. MATTERS HAVE NOT ARRIVED AT POINT FOR FONOFF TO START NEGOTIATIONS WITH U.S. ON BASIS SHIMODA CONCEPT, BUT IT IS "NATURAL" PRIM MIN'S OFF AND OTHERS SHOULD INCLUDE CONCEPT AMONG IDEAS THEY ARE STUDYING.

B. IT IS "TOO EARLY" TO COME FORTH WITH JUDGMENT THAT GOJ MUST AGREE TO NUKES IN OKINAWA IF RETURN OF ADMINISTRATIVE RIGHTS IS TO BE REALIZED; IT IS POSSIBLE TO CONCEIVE OF REVERSION UNDER TERMS BY WHICH U.S. BASES IN OKINAWA WOULD BE BROUGHT UNDER SCOPE OF THE U.S. - JAPAN SECURITY TREATY.

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INR 1. JUNE 16 TOKYO PRESS GIVES PROMINENT ATTENTION TO STATEMENTS
CIA OF AMBASSADOR-DESIGNATE TO US SHIMODA AT JUNE 15 PRESS CONFERENCE
NSA THAT IT "UNREASONABLE" TO THINK OF SOLVING OKINAWA PROBLEM
DOD ON BASIS OF ELIMINATING US BASES THERE AND SOLUTION MUST BE
ACDA THOUGHT OF ON BASIS OF RECOGNIZING PRESENT SITUATION OF
AID BASES. EARLY OKINAWA REVERSION "UP TO OKINAWAN PEOPLE".

RSR
RSC IN SENSE THAT IF MAJORITY OF OKINAWA RESIDENTS AMENABLE TO REVERSION WITH US BASES LEFT IN PRESENT SITUATION, INCLUDING FREEDOM FOR NUCLEAR DEPLOYMENT, IT WOULD BE EASIER FOR GOJ TO NEGOTIATE FOR REVERSION. SHIMODA INDICATED RECENT TALKS WITH GRI LEGISLATURE SPEAKER YAMAKAWA MADE HIM THINK OKINAWANS WOULD AGREE TO SUCH SOLUTION. WHETHER REVERSION OF RYUKYUS WITH PROVISION FOR US NUCLEAR FREEDOM SHOULD BE COVERED BY NEW AGREEMENT OR BY PRIOR CONSULTATION UNDER SECURITY TREATY SHOULD ALSO BE DECIDED PRIMARILY BY DESIRES OF OKINAWANS, SHIMODA SUGGESTED. SHIMODA STRESSED NEED TO CREATE CONSENSUS AMONG JAPANESE PEOPLE BEFORE STARTING DISCUSSIONS WITH US. SOME JAPANESE, HE SAID, SEEMED TO THINK IT MORE IMPORTANT TO GET US BASES OUT OF RYUKYUS THAN TO GET RYUKYUS BACK. HE DID NOT SEE HOW JAPANESE COULD TAKE SUCH STANCE IF OKINAWANS PREFERRED OPPOSITE COURSE. SHIMODA SAID OKINAWA BASES ONE OF FOUNDATIONS FOR PRESERVING INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL BALANCE AND ACCEPTANCE OF REVERSION ON BASIS OF MAINTAINING BASES WOULD NOT AMOUNT TO NEW ACCEPTANCE OF INTRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS INTO JAPAN BUT MERE RECOGNITION OF EXISTING

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Authority NND969000
By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

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XR DEF 15 RYU IS-US

INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

Tokyo 5531 2-7-67

CONFIDENTIAL

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RUHLHS/CINCUSARPAC
RUAUAZ/COMUSJAPAN
STATE GRNC
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L TOKYO 5531

POL 19 RYU IS

REF: A. STATE 130668 - POL 19 RYU IS
B. HC-LN 703409
C. TOKYO 5427 - POL 19 RYU IS-US
XR DEF 15 RYU IS-US
XR POL JAPAN-US

1. COVERAGE JAPANESE PRESS CONTINUED THROUGH FEB 5 ON MANSFIELD STATEMENT AND FONOFF STATEMENT REPORTED REF C ON GRANTING U.S. UNRESTRICTED USE OF BASES IN EXCHANGE FOR REVERSION OF ADMINISTRATIVE RIGHTS.

2. WASHINGTON CORRESPONDENTS OF MAINICHI, YOMIURI AND TOKYO SHIMBUN REPORTED THAT MANSFIELD STATEMENT A PRIVATE VIEW NOT RPT NOT INDICATING A CHANGE IN USG POLICY TOWARDS PACE OF REVERSION. CONFUSION CONTINUES, HOWEVER, WITH FEB 4 ASAHI

PAGE 2 RUALOT 5531D C O N F I D E N T I A L
REPORTING HICOM CALLING ON OKINAWANS TO "DRAW UP PLANS FOR THE ISLANDS RETURN TO JAPAN" IN SPEECH TO RYUKYU LEGISLATURE FEB 3.

3. PRESS COMMENTS AGREE THAT FONOFF STATEMENT REALISTIC IN POINTING OUT REQUISITE QUID PRO QUO FOR COMPLETE REVERSION ADMINISTRATIVE RIGHTS. THIS IN TURN HAS TOUCHED OFF DEBATE ON DEFENSE IMPLICATIONS OF UNRESTRICTED U.S. CONTROL OF BASES AFTER OKINAWA'S REVERSION TO JAPAN. PRESS POINTS OUT THAT U.S. NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS WOULD THEN BE ON JAPANESE SOIL CONTRARY TO NATIONAL POLICY AND PUBLIC SENTIMENT AND WOULD REQUIRE A RENEGOTIATION OF SECURITY TREARY EXCEPTING OKINAWA FROM ITS PROVISIONS. TOKYO SHIMBUN AND SANKEI EDITORIALS FEB 3 SAID THIS WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE.

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

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ACTION: Amembassy TOKYO FLASH
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INFO: Amcongen HONG KONG FLASH
CINCPAC FLASH
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COMUSMACV FLASH
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EXDIS

STATE

Refs: A. State 1498, November 19, 1965

B. State 158819, March 20, 1967

C. State 96274, December 3, 1966

D. State 74431, October 27, 1966

1. Tropical storm vicinity Guam has necessitated evacuation of entire B-52 force (43 aircraft) from Guam to Okinawa. Part of 43 aircraft already on missions will recover Okinawa; remainder directly evacuated from Guam to Okinawa. Storm will necessitate temporary mounting of B-52 operations from Okinawa.

2. To make room for B-52 aircraft on Okinawa, 12 KC-135 tankers have moved to Ching Chuan Kang, Taipei. Defense informs us that remaining

Drafted by:	Tel. Ext.	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:
EA:RMCowherd:gm 7/26/67	5662	EA - William P. Bundy

Clearances:
EA/J - Mr. Sneider
EA/ROC - Mr. Bennett
EA/P - Mr. Armstrong
P - Mr. Arzac
OSD/ISA - Col. Duff (JtStf J3 - MGen. Pickett)
OSD/PA - BGen. Cowles
S/S - Mr. Walker

SECRET
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FORM DS-322
8-65

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By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

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POL 19 RYU IS
XR PEF 15 RYU IS-US
Tokyo 6064 2-27-67

INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

XR POL 15-2 JAPAN

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CONFIDENTIAL

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RUHLHS/CINCUSARPAC
RUAUAZ/USFJ
STATE GRNC
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L TOKYO 6064

1967 FEB 27 AM 6 12

DA FOR ODCSOPS

1. FONOFF HAS INFORMED EMBASSY THAT RYUKYUS ARE EXPECTED TO BE AMONG PRINCIPAL SUBJECTS FOR INTERPELLATIONS IN DIET THIS SPRING, GOJ DESIRES TO BRIEF CABINET MINISTERS AND OTHERS WHO MAY HAVE TO ANSWER QUESTIONS ON THIS SUBJECT ON IMPORTANCE OF RYUKYUS AND U.S. BASES THEREIN TO SECURITY AND DEFENSE OF JAPAN.

2. FONOFF HAS GENERAL INFORMATION ON THIS SUBJECT, OF COURSE, AND ALSO PIECEMEAL INFO RECEIVED ON VARIOUS OCCASIONS BY OFFICIALS VISITING OKINAWA. IT LACKS, HOWEVER, AN OVERALL

PAGE 2 RUALOT 6064D C O N F I D E N T I A L
ASSESSMENT OF IMPORTANCE OF RYUKYUS TO SECURITY AND DEFENSE OF JAPAN, BACKED BY SPECIFIC INFO ON U.S. BASES, THEIR PURPOSES AND USE, NUMBERS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL, ETC. FONOFF HAS ASKED EMBASSY TO INQUIRE IF SUCH ASSESSMENT COULD BE COMPILED AND MADE AVAILABLE. BASIC DOCUMENT SHOULD BE UNCLASSIFIED BUT THERE COULD BE A CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENT, TO EXTENT NECESSARY, FOR INFO OF KEY GOVT OFFICIALS ONLY, IN ORDER TO PROVIDE THEM WITH BACKGROUND AGAINST WHICH TO USE UNCLASSIFIED INFO.

3. DESIRE OF GOJ TO USE THIS KIND OF ARGUMENTATION IN DIET IS WELCOME SIGN AND EMBASSY COULD APPRECIATE MATERIAL FOR REPLY.

GP-3. JOHNSON

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46 POL 19 Ryu Is
XR DEF 15 Ryu Is - US

Tokyo 5862
2-20-67

INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

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FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUABWE/HICOMRY OKI
RUHLHQ/CINCPAC
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UNCLAS TOKYO 5862

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1967 FEB 20 PM 8 08

HICOMRY FOR POLAD
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DA FOR ODCSOPS

SUB: OKINAWA

1. ACCORDING "JAPAN TIMES" ACCOUNT, SATO TOLD PRESS CONFERENCE SATURDAY, WHEN QUIERED ABOUT FONOFF OFFICIAL'S RECENT REMARKS TO EFFECT JAPAN WOULD HAVE TO GIVE U.S. FULL FREEDOM OF OKINAWA BASES IF JAPAN WANTS ADMINISTRATIVE JURSDICTION OVER ISLANDS:

A. "UNITED STATES HAS NO TERRITORIAL AMBITION. SHE IS LOOKING FOWARD TO CHANGE IN SITUATION IN ASIA WHICH WOULD PERMIT RETURN OF OKINAWA TO JAPAN.

PAGE 2 RUALOT 5862 UNCLAS

B. "I AM NOT SAYING THAT THERE WILL BE NO CHANGES IN SITUATION IN ASIA. HOWEVER, I DO NOT BELIEVE OKINAWA WILL BE RTURNED IN NEAR FUTURE.

C. "FOR THIS REASON, I HOPE TO ELIMINATE GAPS IN LIVING STANDARDS OF JAPAN AND OKINAWA.

D. "VICE MIN WAS SPEAKING IN THEORETICAL TERMS. BUT WHEN WE SPEAK ABOUT OUR FORMER TERRITORIES--OKINAWA, BONINS, AND NORTHERN ISLANDS--WE SHOULD CONSIDER THEM AS WHOLE, NOT AS SEPARATE ENTITIES." JOHNSON
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POL 19 Ryu IS
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INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

Tokyo 5427 2-2-67

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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO RUEPDA/DA
RUABWE/HICOMRY
RUHLHQ/CINCPAC
RUHLHS/CINCUSARPAC
RUAUAZ/COMUSJAPAN
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C O N F I D E N T I A L TOKYO 5427

DA FOR ODCSOPS

1. PROMINENT FRONT-PAGE COVERAGE FEBRUARY 1 AND 2 PAPERS GIVEN TO REISCHAUER TESTIMONY BEFORE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE, WITH PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON REMARKS OF SENATOR MANSFIELD WHICH HAVE BEEN INTERPRETED AS FAVORING RETURN OF OKINAWA TO JAPANESE ADMINISTRATION BY 1970.

RSR

2. CHIEF CABINET SECRETARY FUKUNAGA IS QUOTED AS CALLING MANSFIELD STATEMENT MATTER OF JOY AND EXPRESSING EXPECTATION IT WILL LEAD U.S. PUBLIC OPINION IN DIRECTION OF REVERSION.

3. SHORTLY AFTER FIRST REPORTS OF MANSFIELD STATEMENT, RECEIVED IN TOKYO, "HIGHLY PLACED SOURCE IN THE FOREIGN

PAGE 2 RUALOT 5427D C O N F I D E N T I A L
OFFICE" (FONOFF HAS CONFIRMED THIS WAS VICE MINISTER SHIMODA) MADE COMMENTS WHICH HAVE BEEN GIVEN TOP POSITION IN MOST FEBRUARY 2 PAPERS. AS REPORTED IN JAPAN TIMES, WHICH FREQUENTLY IS MOST ACCURATE IN REPORTING FONOFF VIEWS, SOURCE "EMPHASIZED THE NEED FOR JAPAN TO REACH A NATIONAL CONSENSUS REGARDING THE RELATION BETWEEN THE RETURN OF THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, NOW UNDER ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL OF THE U.S., AND THE USE OF AMERICAN MILITARY BASES ON THE ISLANDS."

4. SOURCE WENT ON TO SAY U.S. PRIMARILY CONCERNED WITH UNDISTURBED AND EFFECTIVE FUNCTIONING OF MILITARY BASES AND THAT RETURN OF ADMINISTRATION MIGHT BE FEASIBLE IF JAPAN ASSURED U.S. OF UNENCUMBERED USE OF BASES.

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OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

SECRET/EXDIS

TO : EA - Mr. Bundy

DATE: February 17, 1968

FROM : EA/J - Richard L. Sneider

SUBJECT: B-52 Operations

1. There are no major new developments on B-52 operations from Okinawa. The present state of play is that after two days of operations protests in Okinawa are still on the vocal level. General Unger met with an all-party delegation today but we have no report on what transpired. Unger has come in with another message which I am told adds very little new except that the B-52 operations are becoming increasingly publicly visible. Tokyo has come up with nothing else and apparently the Japanese are still engrossed with the Kuraishi incident and a record snowfall.

2. The key area to watch remains Okinawa since the reaction there will trigger the Japanese. The more protracted period of operations from Okinawa the greater the risk activist elements will needle the generally docile Ryukyuans into major rallies and demonstrations which could force the use of MPs. The Okinawan police force is only 1400 strong and inclined to deal gently with local demonstrations.

3. Trouble in the Ryukyus will obviously force Sato's hand and expose him to a serious dilemma. If he fails to reflect Okinawan protests in approaches to us, he will be the target of major political attacks as a "tool" of the Americans. If he hits us, he knows he is asking for trouble with Washington, weakening his case for future reversion, but more important exposing his inability to influence the Americans on an issue crucial to Japan. Sato can't win and I suspect he knows it. Needless to say, Sato's plans for gradually bringing the public around to realistic security policies could at least be set back.

4. My conclusions are that we are more likely to have a slowly developing crisis contingent upon how much heat is generated in the Ryukyus in the first instance. In the longer term this could clearly affect prospects for working out an acceptable reversion arrangement with the Japanese. Three factors have to be borne in mind. First, pressure is bound to build up for early reversion. Second, the election prospects of the pro-U.S. conservatives in the Ryukyus will be hurt and we could get an uncooperative government in power, again adversely affecting the reversion picture. Finally,

SECRET/EXDIS

EA/J:RLSneider:rm

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